Preliminary Gemini 4 Crew Debriefing, Part I, 1965

I /00 Authority: DECLASSIFIED NW 91526 f Group 4: 82 CLASSIF!CAT:ON CHANGE o____ 3 8 By authority of--~4,...L.11.1-...___.~~L--L-....t.-e=---1 hanged by U~1:i:.~1 LDate 1973 42, / /4­ PRELIMINARY GT-4 FLIGHT CREW DEBRIEFING TRANSCRIPI' PART I Prepared By Spacecraft Operat ions Branch Flight Crew Support Division June 16, 1965 This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws , Title 18. U. S. C Section 793 and 794 , the transmission or revel a­ tion of which in any manner to an unaut horized person is prohi bi ted by law. Downgrade at 3 year intervals Declassified after 12 years NOTICE: This document may be exempt from public disclosure under the Freedom of lnfor• rnation Act (5 U.S.C. 552). Requests for Its ra• lec1~e to persons outside the U. S. Government should be handled under the provisions of NASA Polley Cir-ecti11e 1382.2, I COI\JFIDENTIAt PREFACE This preliminary transcript was made from voice tape recordings of the GT-4 flight crew debriefing conducted aboard the recovery ship, the USS Wasp, on June 9, 1965. Although all the material contained in this transcript has been edited, the urgent need for the preliminary transcript by mission analysis personnel precluded a thorough editorial review prior to its publication. Errors in this transcript will be corrected as soon as possible and an official transcript will be published at a later date. This document contains a transcript of the first part of the debriefing, during which the crew described the mission generally from an operational viewpoint . A preliminary transcript of the re­ mainder of the debriefing will be published by June 23, 1965. It will cover systems operations, operational checks, visual sightings, experiments , pre-mission planning, mission control, and training. TABLE OF CONTENTS Paragraph Page Number 1.0 COUNTDOWN 1 . 1 Crew Insertion. ... ................... . . . .. . 1 1. 2 Cornmlll1ications . . . . . ............... .. ... . .. .. 2 1. 3 Crew Participation and Countdown.... ..............-..6 1.4 Comfor t . ....................... . .7 1. 5 Environmental Control System .................... ' ..... . ,9 1.6 Sounds ...... . .... 11 1. 7 Vibrations .. . . ... 13 1. 8 Visual .. . ....... .. . . ... 13 1.9 Crew Station Controls and Displays .1 5 2.0 POWERED FLIGHT 2. 1 Lift- Off Cues ....................... 17 2.2 Roll Program 2.3 Pitch Program ... . ..... 19 2.4 Aerodynamics .... . 20 • • M • • 2. 5 Environmental Control System . .... "" ............... 20 2.6 Maximum g ....... . ....... 21 2. 7 Windshear ...... . . . ...... 21 2.8 DCS Update ........................ 22 • • • • • • • M. • 2.9 Engine 1 Operation ..... . 22 2. 10 Engine 2 Status .. . .23 2.11 Accel eration g's .. . . ........ 23 2. 12 BECO ........ . ...... . . ........ 24 2. 13 Staging . . . ...... . .. .................... 25 2. 14 Engine 2 Ignition . .. 25 2. 15 RGS Initiate .... . ... 26 2. 16 GO/NO GO . ............. . ................. . .. 28 2.17 Systems Status ........ . ' .... . ..... 28 2. 18 Acceleration ................... . . .. .. 31 2.19 SECO. ....... . ...................... . .... 31 2. 20 Steering ....................................... . . .. .... 32 3.0 INSERTION 3.1 Post-S.EDO •... 34 3.2 SECO + 20 Seconds ................ .. 35 3.3 Insertion Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 ORBITAL FLIGHT 4. 1 Station- Keeping ....... .... .. ......... . .......... ... 50 4.2 Extravehicular Activities ............ . . ......... - ..87 Ot her Orbital Operations ..... ~86 Preretro Preparations ... . ........ ..... 250 5.0 6.0 1.0 REI'ROFIRE 5.1 5. 2 5. 3 5.4 5.5 5. 6 5. 7 5.8 5.9 T - 36 Events ... . ~ - 22 Events .. . :5:i- 13 Events :5:i- 12 Event s ... . !R-5 Events .. . ........ . ~R: 1 ~eennttss • ••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • iir.: 0 .c, v •••••••••••••••••••• Ret r opack Jettison ........... . Communicat i ons ... . ........... . REENTRY 6. 1 Reentry Parameter Update 6.2 400 K .................. . 6.3 0. 4 g ................ . 6.4 Acceleration Profile 6. 5 Spacecraft Control ........ . 6.6 100 000 Feet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... . 6.7 50 000 Feet ............. . 6.8 Main Chute Deployment . . 6.9 CommUJ1ications . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6.10 Singl e-Point Rel ease .... 6. 11 Pos tmain Checkli st Items LANDI NG AND REDOVERY 7.1 7. 2 7.3 7.4 7. 5 7.6 7. 7 7.8 7.9 7. 10 7. 11 Impact ...... . Checklists Communi cations ... . . ............ 259 . ... 260 ... 260 .. 261 . ... 265 .... 270 .... 273 . ... 280 .••• 281 .•••• 282 . .... 282 . . .. 284 ..... 290 .... 296 ...... 296 .. •.. 299 . ...... 302 . .... 303 . ........... . .... 305 ......... ·•....... 306 ... 310 .. 313 ... 314 Systems Configuration ..................... 316 Spacecraft Status ...... . .... . . ............ 320 Post-Landing Activiti es ..... . . ............... 325 C·omfort ............... . . .. . .. .... ... 325 Recovery For ce Personnel .. 326 Egress ......... . .. . . . 327 Survival Gear ..... . ...• 328 Crew Pi ckup ......... . . ....... 328 1.1 Crew Insertion White McDivitt White CO ►~FIDE►~TIAb. 1.0 COUNTDOWN The only problem during insertion was that I fogged up again in my suit before we got the fans on. I think I'm just going to always fog up in that suit of mine. We turned the fans on quick, but with the visors closed it doesn't go out. We did have a problem with crew insertion on the Wet Mock and I think we had that probably pretty well taken care of. They put us on the suit loops and didn't turn the fans on. Normally you wait for a clearance from the 1:t>acecraft Test Conductor before you throw any switches. Well, after we almost "died" of carbon dioxide poison­ ing during this +,est~ we got this matter clarified. As soon as we got in the spacecraft and one of us was on the suit loop, we would go ahead and cut the switches on to put us on two fans. We did this during insertion in the Wet Mock. It really went well. We really went for a long time in Wet Mock. was beginning to wonder if I was going to have to open my visor. I was really uncomfortable. COt74 FIDEt~TIAsb­ I 2 McDivitt White McDivitt White 1. 2 Communications White McDivitt White McDivitt But everything worked out okay on this one. Yes. The timing was excellent , I thought. I didn't think we had any probl em at all . No. I don ' t believe they missed a stroke on the insertion. I think the communications were pretty well worked out, Jim? Right. One thing, the last three minutes or four minutes, we got a little confused about who was talking to who . I was getting the Spacecraft Test CJnductor, the Booster Test CJnductor and the CAP COM at the same time. We got a split count , too, on lif't--off. The first three or four minutes I was hearing the B)oster Tast C?nductor. I heard what was going on on his loop , and I was listening to him get checks in f r om all of the guys . I really wasn ' t getting a clue as to what was going on. I was supposed to be getting the booster clues from the test conductor. I was supposed to find out when the engines were going to gimbal and when they -€9·NFl9E~TIA;t White McDivitt COl>J~IDENIIA~ 3 were going to open the prevalves and stuff. I wasn't getting it from him. We were getting a lot of other information that made a lot of sense to the Booster Test C:>nductor, but not an awful lot to us . There were cal l - outs l ikeVSequence 05003 complete." Well, this just didn' t mean any­ thing to us . On top of this we had the Spacecraft ~est Conductor calling out the times , and super­ imposed on all of this was Al Shephard, the Cape CAP COM, calling out events that he was reading off that went on at certain specified times . He called out','Stage 1 prevalvesVand we could hear the fuel gushing downstairs and the whole booster rumbling. He called out','Stage 2 prevalves','and you could hear the same thing all over again. I thought t hat was a lot more meaningful than the test conductor comments. I think that was wrong, the way they were doing it . I think we weren't supposed to be on any loop except CAP COM at that time. Well, I think what happened was that we got this thing over-coordinated. Al was going to give us all this information, but then as a result of GT-3, (Gus and Jolm said they didn ' t get enough -t:ON FI0 Er\JTl~L 4 White McDivitt r<3 eI<i FltEt>I TIRt information about the boosters) they put this in­ formation on the test conductor' s loop too . We ha.d too many guys talking. I think if just CAP COM talked from thr ee minutes on down we would be all right . This is the way I thought it was going to happen, and then from three minutes on down it really got busy with the yak , yak, yak of everybody talking. I don't lmow whether we got off the Booster ~st C)nductor's loop or not, but at final countdown, Al gave me 2 minutes , 1 1/2, 1, 30, 20 , 10 , 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1. I got a similar count from the Spacecraft Test C~nductor but it turned 01 ·.t that they were a second out of sequence on the countdown and Al was giving me 10 and our Spacecraft Test Conductor was giving me 9. So it went ten-nine, nine-eight, eight-seven. They were at the same t ime . All I knew was that we were getting close to engine ignition and then it started . So, we got a little over-communicated there . I think t hey kept us adequately informed on the hold. As a matter of fact , I ' d say we got over-informed there at the end. We had too many guys keeping us informed and I think the pendulum <Ol<:JFIDel'4TIAl 5 White McDivitt White McDivitt swung from the GT-3 flight where nobody got in­ formed of anything over to our flight where we got i nformed by three different people about the same event. On our flight, too, we were really more aware of t he problem than those people were. We could sit right here and see the gantry come down and stop, that was really the only problem they had in the whole count . I don't think radio discipline is a problem, Each guy was disciplined on his own channel . They were conducting their tests on their own channel . But we were lis tening to three different communica­ tors at the same time. We should have had only one. I think probably what we will need to do is to get to about T-3, and then just cut in the CAP COM. That was the way it wa.s planned to be, I thought. That's the way Al planned it. That's correct. I think, because there had been some lack of information on GT-3, that it some­ how had been written into the SEDR so that we were also on the Booster Test Conductor's MOPS, so that we were also getting his countdown. I COrq--pf0f:Nfl1tt 6 White McDivitt think CAP COM, 'alone, would have been sufficient . One further comment , I had to turn my ·11HF volume all the way up to hear anybody. I was at max. There we were sitting right on the pad , talking to a gu:y two miles away, and there I was with the volume full up . It didn ' t give me much confi­ dence as to reception I was going to get when I was 200 miles away , or three or four or five hundred miles away . I thought that the volume control on the radio was inadequate. We were wondering what we were going to have when we got up a hundred miles. That's right. At max volume we didn't have enough and at minimum volume it didn't shut it off. We will cover this later. 1.3 Crew Participation and Countdown McDivitt I think it was just about right . I don' t think we were over worked and I think we had enough to do to keep us busy. White Actually, all we really made was a check of switches . There wasn ' t really too much else. Having the back-up crew run that midcount was the the right solution. I wouldn't have wanted to participate in anymore of t he countdown than I -COt<JFtDEt'4flJ<l 7 McDivitt 1.4 Comfor t White €O ► 4FIDE ► ~TI/>,~ did. That's an excellent point. The flight crew's participation should be the final count, not the midcount and precount. It doesn't tire the prime crew out doing a lot of chores that they don't really have to do. I think this is a good pro­ cedure. Initially, the first 20 or 30 minutes, I was squirming around and I felt a little uncomfor­ table. But after I had been in for 30 or 40 minutes I didn't feel there was a real restric­ tion on staying for several more hours. I would have been very disappointed if they had said, "Well you have been in there long enough and we will work on this gantry and try it again tomor­ row." I would have been happy to stay there several more hours while they fixed the gantry instead of pulling me out. After an hour and 40 minutes,which is the end of the normal countdown,I didn't feel uncomfortable. We sat in the simulator and were a lot more un­ comfortable than this. I didn't feel uncomfor­ table. I had a chance to take a couple of little CO ► 4FIDE~~TIA~ 8 McDivitt White McDivitt White COl'IFIDE~4TIAt naps. I noticed Jim was napping too. Yes. I concur with F.d, although I don't want to get carried overboard. We shouldn't scrub due to crew fatigue . I think it is up to the crew. If the crew is un­ comfortable they should come down. But I don't think he should say, "Okay, two hours and 30 minutes . You cut this off. ", because it is an operational procedure. When I first got assigned to the crew I always fel t one of the toughest things to do would be laying back for an hour and 40 minutes or so prior to launch. The time we spent in the simu­ lator laying on our back, I thought to be a very uncomfortable position. As we went through all the training and testing at McDonald, and again at the Cape , ;ny back got more callouses on it. I got used to laying with my feet over my head. At launch time I wasn't a bit tired from laying on my back. This is brought out in one of our last simulations , where we ran the whole four hour simulation and we forgot to have them tilt us up to 30 degrees. We just got used to running that way, COl"I P"te E~~Tl,\l 9 €Otr4FIDEttftAl McDivitt That ' s right, I just don't think we should scrub the flight because of fatigue.I don ' t think we should do that. We weren ' t approaching this point. White We had a long way to go. 1. 5 Environmental Control System McDivitt I think we ought to get this water management panel squared away and everybody figure out what we are supposed to do with those switches. I don ' t think we should be arguing about where the switches are supposed to be on the launch pad. If I hadn't asked somebody where the waste manage­ ment switches should be we would have probably launched with it in · EVAPORATOR. I knew that i t wasn't supposed to be in the evaporator. At one of the ten thousand briefings we got on it, we were told it shouldn't be there. We ought to get· this kind of stuff squared away before launch day. Thirty minutes before lift-off we were arguing about where that switch was supposed to be. White I wasn't confident that they knew where they wanted that switch to be. McDivitt Well, I didn ' t think we should have it in the eva­ porator. So, I think that water panel could have cost as much as a wee~s slip on our launch because coNFIDENTIAt­ 10 €01'1FIE>Et<ITtAt White McDivitt they didn't know where to put those valves and it's only got three valves on it. It ought to be made much simpli er than it is . I think they should get that squared away before the next flight. F,d and I knew where we wanted it. We wanted it off and the other two switches in NORMAL and leave it alone. That's what we flew with. That's the way it ought to be fixed . We can get canned , though, for not flying with it in the right position by the checklist . It didn't say that on the checklist Every check list we got was different . That ' s right! Fach one was different . Fi nally we decided we were going to do it as w.e did and left it thr ough out the whol e flight . Evel;'y­ thing worked fine . We had ECS briefings by a mul titude of peoples from MAC including the guys who designed it. Everyone of them dis­ agreed , It probably started out to be one of the simplest things in the whole spacecraft. By the time they got t hrough confusing us with it, I got the feeling nobody knew what was s_i,,.pposed to happen to it. I consider this the most danger­ ous of all. '€0 l<I F' IE> Et-q ftAt White McDivitt McDivitt 1.6 Sounds McDivitt 11 I was convinced of that, too, after the mix-up in putting all the water in the lithium hydroxide tan.ks. There would have been about a 30 minute four-day mission. The people that built the thing don't know how it is supposed to go. They had better decide this and let us know. I felt that George Roe at the Cape knew what was going on except the Cape personnel got the valves in the wrong position and almost lost the lithium hydroxide canister full of water with no water in the tanks. I ' m not pointing a finger at George Roe • I think he'·s pret.ty knowledgeable about the system.. Maybe somebody just wasn't following directions. But somebody ought to find out about the water management system and make it clear to everybody how it is supposed to be operated. You can hear the prevalve~ both first and second s tages. The prevalves and the fluid gushing are very loud noises comparable to the engine gim-­ baling. I wasn't really aware that they were ~ going to be that loud. C-0t~FIDf~qflAb 12 'COI\IFIDE~◄ llAl White McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt I got that feeling when I read Gus and John ' s debriefing. Did you? I didn't. I got the impression that it was going to be a much quieter noise. Well, the whole noise level of the engine girnbal­ ing was louder than I thought it was going to be. It surprised me . Yes. Engine gimbaling was much louder than I heard before. We heard this during Wet Mock and during precount and at midcount. You can hear those engines gimbal around; they really shake the spacecraft. But, I really wasn't prepared for the big noise that the prevalves make, and such a long noise as that fuel gushed down to the bottom. I guess that was what it was. I didn't like t he sounds and vibrations we got when they raised and lowered the gantry. It shook the whole spacecraft. It shook the whole spacecraft--did you notice how it never came up straight? The spacecraft was supposed to line up kind of like this and then wham! I had visions of them knocking us off and laying us flat on the ground before we were launched, co~,Fl0Et'4TIAI: 13 1,7 Vibrations White McDivitt White 1,8 Visual White McDivitt White McDivitt cor:,-~FIDEl'~TIA I Those are closely associated with the sounds. Yes. I think that the engine gimbaling makes a tremendous vibration in the spacecraft and pre­ valves on opening and make a tremendous vibration. The gantry going back and forth vibrated the spacecraft. I don ' t think there is anything else, do you? No. Well, you can sure see the gantry lower and the white room disappear. That is about all you can see besides the sky. That's pretty impressive. That's when I sort of got excited,when the gantry went down. That ' s a new realm. I thought they were going to launch me. You're sitting there by yourself then, instead of all those people milling around. I do want to make one other comment on this visual thing. We did Wet Mock about one or two o'clock in the afternoon. The sun was shining right in the window, almost straight down, such that the sun came across my visor from about just at the GOt~FIDEMTIM 14 White McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt t:Ol-<IFIDEt'4T IAt bridge of my nose on down. I had a tremendous amount of reflection inside the helmet, and I had a great amount of difficulty seeing the instru-­ ment panel. As a matter of fact, I'm not sure I could have seen the instrument panel at all . ~ose first few seconds there are extremely cri­ tical on launch. You have to be able to see those tank pressure sages. We ought to keep this in mind for those late afternoon launches . That is a problem, but the g loads are so small at this time you could almost forget ab1ut look­ ing up. Did I fly like this for awhile during l aunch? I don't think so but you could have, The g load is so small. I'm not sure whether I did or not. "'his is what we had to do during Wet Mock. We had to put our hand up and cover the window to look down at our instruments to see them, I 'm not sure I didn ' t launch that way . I wouldn't be surprised if you did. I don't think I launched that way, but as we tilted over and we got in the sun, I think I put my hand up for awhile. COMftDEl'1 IIAI. 15 White McDivitt White Well, if the g's are so low that-­ When sun gets in your face you can't see the in­ strument panels because they are just too dark. The sun gets in your eyes. The point that Jim was making is towards a late-in-the-day launch, which we might have later in the program, there might be a bit of a problem of seeing the instru­ ments during launch. Unless they put something up, which I really don't think you want to d~ You are just going to have to put your arms up and shield the sun out and concent~ate on your in­ struments or you won't see them. They are just gone. There is probably a point even in an early morn­ ing trajectory as you start to pitch over where the sun will come right in your window and you won't be able to see your instruments unless you shield your eyes. 1,9 Crew Station Controls and Display White McDivitt I found the switches all where they were supposed to be and the cockpit all set up. So did I, except the comment I made on the water management system. They didn't have the control where it was supposed to be. At least, they had 16 White ~CNFIOEt~TIAt it in the place where everybody was arguing about whether or not it should be, I certainly appreciated the work the backup crew did getting the cockpit all set up for us. Every­ thing was ready to go when we stepped in. That ' s the way it should be. COl<:tll10E~4TIAL 17 2.1 Lift-Off Cues McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt €Ot◄ Fl9ENllAl 2.0 POWER FLIGHT CAP COM gave lift-off, about as good a cue as you can get. Wasn't any question either. Boy, you could feel the first little motions of the booster as it went up. It was really great! I think you could feel the acceleration at re­ lease. There wasn't a doubt in my mind that we were loose. That 's right. I don't know if I could feel the bolts or hear them. As a matter of fact, it seemed to steady out a little bit. The vibrations seemed to decrease a little. Pretty impressive! Not much vibration at lift-off. Very low. Very low. I got vibrations later on, though, didn't you? Yes. Noise. There wasn't much noise, was there? No. There was less than I had expected. Noise wasn't a cue to lift-off. Noise was there 18 White McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt if you were bolted down all day long. I don't think the noise changed a bit at lift- off. You could see the visual cues out the window. You were watching your gages, Jim. Were there clouds out there? No, but I could see it in the clear blue sky. Could you? Yes. I could see the motion. Okay. Well, I couldn't. I was looking out, I saw a little cloud go by and then I didn ' t see any more clouds at all, It was beautiful! The event timer st arted just like it should, Of course, that 's the best display inside the space­ craft for lift-off. The event timer starts , and it did, We got both clocks started with the t ime hack. had a watch hack on lift-off and the ... handle going. I knew when the engine ignited, within half a second accuracy. Three seconds later I was waiting for the lift-off and it came right at three seconds, We could tell ignition, too . We could hear the '€0 ► ~FIDEJ>1TJAL I 19 2·. 2 White Roll Program McDivitt White McDivitt White 2. 3 McDivitt White Pitch Program McDivitt White things go. I agree with you. I knew we weren ' t going to hold it when that lift-off went. Roll program came in at ten seconds just like it was supposed to. I t was smooth, and it was just the way it was planned, on at ten seconds and went out at twenty seconds. Could you see it roll out the window? You can see everything out the window, I think. You can probably tell by the way the sun rays are moving, can't you? Yes, by change in lighting. The right seat has a better view. You have to watch the guages so closely. I didn ' t even look out the window. I know you didn't. Pitch program started just like it was supposed to, at twenty three seconds. Pitched over the proper amount, the pitch needles looked like they were hanging in there all the way. You could see the booster pitch definitely, and that was mainly due to a change in the lighting. 20 2 ,4 Aerodynamics McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt Whi te co~~FIDE~~TIAt: We were getting aerodynamic noise, which built up to max q. We got some pretty good vibrations at max q. That's where I had the most vibrations . It was just shaking like this. It was vibrating and noisy. That was the loudest noise we received the whole flight. Right after max q it got very qui et . This is where I had the most vibrations. There were more than I expected. Yes, me too. You can' t simulate this in a simula­ tor. You get more vibrations than you do noise. The only thing they have in the simulator is noise, they don't have vibrations. It was pretty loud and the spacecraft was actually shaking around a lot. It was really vibrating. Yes, it was. More than I expected. The whole thing was really going at it. Almost like a F-80 or a T-33 at a.bout 0.8 Mach. Very good analogy. 2. 5 Environmental Control System White The cabin started venting shortly after lift-off ~O~◄ FltJEf<tftAL 21 McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt 2.6 Maximum q .... McDivitt White McDivitt White 2. 7 Windehea.r McDivitt and continued so until about 40 seconds and sta­ bilized out at 5.5 and I made my call in. I think I might have called in on RECORD. You did. I switched and made the final call at about 1:10, I realized I called on REDORD and switched over, How high did it go? Did it go to 5.5? 5. 5 and it stayed right there. And then I noticed later on it progressively leaked off until it got to 4.9 where it stayed. The suit? There really isn' t anything to say about the suit. No, I don' t have anything to say about the suit. It oi:erated like it was supposed to. The noise built up gradually until we got to max q , then it just dropped off. The deterioration of the noise was almost instan­ taneous. Very quick, It wasn ' t instantaneous , but it was very quick. In fact, it startled me when we separated. I didn't notice anything on the rate needles that had anything to do with the windshea.r I couldn't 22 eot~FIDE~~"f1At pick out windshear • on them. How about you, Ed? White No. McDivitt Did you see any attitudes? White No . McDivitt No big divergences from windshear . 2.8 DC~ Updates White We got both of our ros updates right on time-­ H'45 a.nd 2: 25, McDivitt No comment. Ed is in charge of ros updates. White I 'm the button pusher. I do everything about pushing the buttons. McDivitt I can do this with this little stick. White You can do it unless I have my knee over it. 2. 9 Engin,®. 1 Operation McDivitt They operated the way they were supposed to as far as I could tell . The tank pressures stayed up fi~ on both Engine 1 and Engine 2. There was never any doubt in my mind that they were going to stay up there. There weren't any of those things like we saw in those simulations where they came on down pretty low on the gages when they were supposed to be at 18 or 15. There wasn't anything like that . They just stayed on up there. €0t'1Flf7ENf 1Al 23 White Just where they were supposed to be. McDivitt Yes. I followed them a couple of times and said they were staying up fine. They were way up. There wasn't any problem there, 2.10 Engine 2 Status McDivitt Second stage pressure stayed right on up there very high. Just the way they were supposed to. There wasn't any problem there, They didn't decay all during the first stage. 2.11 Acceleration g's McDivitt They weren't bad and I don't know where they went to on the g meter. White Just like riding in an old saddle. McDivitt That's right. It's very comfortable. Steady on­ set. White Not very long. Gee, we were below-- McDivitt Wait a second. This might be a good place to cover the pogo. I felt the pogo just prior to staging, from about 2:15 on to 2:30. I could feel pogo. White How much were you getting? McDivitt Very little, I could just feel it pull like this. Did you feel it at all? 24 White McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt 2.12 BEX;O McDivitt - COt~FIDEt ◄ TIM No . I could feel it . It wasn't uncomfortable enough where I had to l ift my head or anything. I wasn't thinking about a pogo at all. It wasn't like I was trying to sit there and think about it. But as we were going along I could feel this vi­ bration. And then it just crossed my mind, well there is pogo, and then we went on to staging. But it wasn ' t bad at all . The amplitude must have been-­ You were paying more attention to your clocks while I was watching the system ,gages and I wasn't really aware of the times that were going on. I had my eyes- ­ It came around 2: 15 or so and lasted to about 2:30. Maybe it was 2: 10 or 2:05 , but it wasn't bad . We had one area that I will get into later that I haven't told you about and that I didn't like. Oh. So , I think we hit the pogo and the g ,. s . Engine shut down properly. The lights came on. Engine~- 2 light went out and the Engine 1 lights went out. Just the way it was supposed to at B~O and staging. Two Stage 1 lights ON , Stage 2 EOt<I flf)Et ◄ Tl1'c b 25 COt ◄FIB~1'1llAl White McDivitt 2. 13 Staging McDivitt 2. 14 Engine 2 Ignition McDivitt White McDivitt White light OFF, Stage 1 lights OFF. At that time I realized that we were going to feel the pyros and stuf'f--feel the separation. It was a very distinct feeling when we sepa rated. Of course, we immediately dropped in the thrust . There wasn't any question,we had a good separation, in my mind. This is just the way it was for all of our separations. Ev-erytime we separated, it was very clear that was what had happened. Oh, yes, there wasn't a:ny doubt about it when that first stage shut off--Voom! Staging was just as it should have been. Engine 2 started right on up. Like I mentioned earlier~the light went out and the tank pressure went down just a tad, but it stayed way up there, about two or three times as high as was necessary for staging. It never really did decrease. It stayed up around 45 or 50 psi, and we need 20 for staging, so-­ I couldn' t hear anything. Didn't you hear the engine? No. I was listening but it still was quiet. €Ot~FIDENllAL -­ 26 McDivitt Whit e McDivitt White McDivi tt 2 . 15 RGS Initiate McDivitt 'COl'4FIDEl'ffIA-t I didn't really get much of a cue out of it at all, except the lights went out and I could feel a lit tle bit of acceleration. The acceleration decreased. Another thing I didn't get--I got absolutely no pitch-up associ-· ated with the--the way the centrifuge does you at the end of an acceleration. I think that is associated with the cab on-­ Yes . I think that's the way they rotate those gimbals when you come on down. If they rotate them a certain way you can get that pitching-up-­ A very safe forward-type deceleration. I think that pitching up on the centrifuge is not a malfunction. It' s just the programing that's hooked into the gimbals during the stop program. You've got to get them all going the same way so that you keep the vectors through you. During l aunch the vector is right through you. It's not varying around , but in the shut-down on the cen­ trifuge those darn gimbals aren't always syn­ chronized together. They get shifted back there and it gives you that peculiar sensation. Well, I was really watching closely but my rate White McDivit t White McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt needles just barely changed . We mus t not have had any errors at al l . Yes , I got a full error. Did you have a full error? Yes, my pitch error went all the way down , and then it just steered slowly right back up. Re­ member you-­ You did call and tell me you had a saturated-­ Di d you call saturated , or did you say we had a bi g one? I called it saturated, I believe. That ' s right. I called a saturated error and then I called you that it was steering back to zer o. Yes . I remember that you did call that. That ' s the way they showed this on the plot, t hat i t would saturate there , am very quickly it seemed to gradually steer right back up. The steering rates that went in were on the order of less than half a degree/second. They were very low. Very, very low because I was on high scale. The needle just barely deviated at all at RGS GO~JFIDEN"flAl 28 White McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt White 2. 16 GO/ NO GO McDivitt 2, 17 Systems Status White initiate. It was beautiful steering. Nominal, nominal, nominal, except like that saturation on the error needle, but we have been briefed on that. That ' s right. That ' s something to be expecterui When did it saturate? Right at staging. No, right at guidance initiate. Oh, okay. It saturated right there. Right there at guidance initiate, which is what you ' d except. They said they were GO and I said we were GO . There wasn't much problem. Ed and I had been checking back and forth on the systems . I knew they were all right. The systems were all pretty good. There was only one I didn ' t like and that was the stack readings on the main ammeters. One was reading about 28 and the other was reading about 14, But I felt that this was associated with bringing the batter­ ies on. I went through and checked everything. Everything was readi ng properly. The control bus McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt White and main bus were all reading all right. I felt it was just a misbalance of loading. I talked to somebody previous to this time and it was explained to me that this could happen this way. I felt perhaps it was in the adapter batteries-­ would feed through on one of the stacks causing one of them to take more than the other. Yes. You could have gotten into the knee of an adapter-­ This is what I had figured-- that a couple of my adapter aatteries were unbalanced, causing this to occur. I also had seen this on the simulator quite a few times. When did the unbalance start? When we got in they were-• As soon as we were on internal power? Right. And I didn't feel this was the time to talk about it. It was still under 30 amps, which was my point. So I didn't bring it up. You didn't want to worry me? I didn't want to worry you and I didn't want any­ body on the ground to start hollering about it. You should have written me a note. I did feel that this was exactly what it was-­ ~Q~~ftE)EN:rJAL­ 30 McDivitt White McDivitt that it was adapter batteries. That was the only abnormal type of indication we had in the systems. They were all real good. Well, we had good communications with the ground during powered flight. We had pretty good communications. I called the "Roll Program", and nobody answered me. I said, "Well , to heck with it, maybe they just aren't ge t;ti.ng through." Then I was just starting to call Roll Program complete when Gus called and said,"Did you get the Roll Program?" Now that was the only transmission I made that wasn't acknow­ ledged. Yes, I heard you calling, too. So , if they lost communications it must have been right at the 10-seconds t i me , and it should have been for l ess than 10 seconds. It couldn't have been for more than 20 seconds. I heard the count­ down to lift-off and I heard Gus call and ask me if I had the Roll Program started . This was a little bit less t han 20 seconds-- around 18 or 19 seconds. That is the only period of time I didn' t hear anybody I should have heard. So , if we lost communications, that was where it was. 31 2.18 Acceleration McDivitt White McDivitt White 2. 19 SECO McDivitt White McDivitt Well we got up to 7 1/2 g's. The acceleration wasn ' t bad at all. I guess when you are really interested in what you are doing like on the boost or reentry, those g's don't mean anything. I don't like to ride the centrifuge. 7 1/2 g's is 7 1/2 g's on the centrifuge, but on the booster-­ My vision was crystal clear. Me, too . I wasn't even breathing hard. I wasn ' t huffing or :pui'fing or anything. I was just laying <there relaxed . Particularly on this one, The acceleration burn during powered flight and insertion was very light . SECO occurred as it should have on my clock. Ed thought it ~s about--what did you say it was? I thought it was a second or so early and it concerned me because that meant we were going to have to burn. So I was quite expecting to hear a big 6V come up from the ground. There is no question on that SECO either. It shuts off and you get that linear straight deceleration. The thing that surprised me was that we weren ' t talking about it at all. We were just going as , CONFID·EN"TtAt 32 White 2.20 Steering McDivitt White McDivitt Whi te straight as an arrow when that thing shut off. There weren't any oscillations or roll. I was getting a sinusoidal oscillation on my rate needles , and I don ' t know now whether it was pitch and yaw. I cal l ed it out a t the time , to you a:nyway, Eli . Right. And my attitude arrows were- ­ Your attitude arrows were right on? Okay. But I was getting an oscillation, very small, about plus or minus a quarter degree in rates . Not so that the needle was actually moving back and forth across the dots. It was pretty obvious that it was. Now, I sort of felt that I could feel that movement a littl e bit, like this , but not annoy­ ingly and certainly the stabilization was holding i t close enough. But it wasn ' t that the rate needles were just constantly oscillating back and forth. It seems to me it was in pitch but I'm not really sure . A booster pitch, The attitude error needles were the only deviation we had at any time. Yaw was just about nominal all the time. We had the pitch deviation at guidance initiate. It went to full scale and steered right • COt~Ft0ENflAL 33 McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt back in, and also right at the end we had, in pitch, a little bit of a pitch-down needle indi­ cation which increased to no more than about a degree at booster shutdown. You got about a degree,then,on shut down? Just about a degree. Yes. I kept glancing over to see how you were doing, They were always right near the center for me. Yeah. Right near the end they trailed do,.m just a little bit. I 'd be interested to see what the ground thought on this. Yes. You'll have to go over and look. I'm sure they have them. €6Nft[:)ENTI.AL 34 3,1 Post- SECO McDivitt White 3.0 INSERTION Yes . There was a Post-SECO. In the period be­ tween SEX:!O and SECO + 20 seconds, I unstowed the maneuver controller. I don ' t know where our attitudes were. They were the same as they were a t SEX::O, and it was about 20 degrees pitch-down, wasn ' t it? The rates during this period were on the order of less than a half a degree/second. We really had a period of from SECO to SECO + 30. So, duri ng this time I actually fired the trans­ lations thrusters at least two times in one axis to kill off the rate in t hat axis, and I think it was probably the booster yaw or spacecraft pitch where I act ually fired the U,rusters once or twice to bring the rates back. It might have been the other way around. But, we didn't jetti­ son the fairings then. I did unstow the maneuver controller and the attitude was the booster burn­ out attitude and the rates were very low, less than a half a degr ee/second. I think we mentioned prior to this time the feeling that we came off a little half­ (Q~~IQFNTIAL 35 3. 2 SECO + 20 Seconds McDivitt White McDi vitt White McDivitt cocked off the second stage. We were going to $ay on the booster until SECO + 30 instead of SECO + 20. At 20 seconds the IVI ' s started displaying and I read them off as 20 for­ ward, 11 right, and 5 down. Right , This was when we were still in the 90 degree bank position. Is that correct? Or was it after I had rolled right-side-up? It was after you had rolled right-side-up. Okay. Well, then the IVI's displayed when we were still on our side. It seems to me they were about 25 feet/second forward , and some other numbers, but anyway they were low enough where I felt we were certainly in orbit. At least the IGS was telling us we were in orbit. During this time, as I said earlier, I tried to damp the spacecraft rates, the spacecraft booster rates which were quite low. I checked to see that the OAMS Power Switch was in ATTITUDE and MANEUVER , and to see that Eli had switched over to DIRECT. I told him I was going to do some thrusting but I wasn't going to separate yet, so that when he € 0 ~~ FfDENT.I.Al White McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt White ~EIDENJl»,t heard the thrusters go off he wouldn't push the SPACECRAFT SEP. Then we did separate the space­ craft with the ·exact routine we practiced in the simulator. I said, "Thrusting, separate", and you punched the SEPARATE button and I guess you went to Rate Command. I thrusted straight ahead for about five seconds. This is where I think we came off crooked. This is the part Ed was men­ tioning before. We didn't seem to come off straight ahead. We seemed to be getting some sort of an oscillation that got us going in a dif­ ferent direction than what we had going on the booster. It seemed,, like one side of the separation plane came off with more force than the other. Yes. That's what it seemed like to me. It separated at a bit of an angle. That's right. We didn't separate fore and aft; we separated with a lot of rotation to this side. Yes. Air-ground communications were all right. We were talking to them and they were talking to us. I never had any problem there. Shortly thereafter they called up and told us we i C&MFfEiEM IIAL 37 McDivitt White McDivitt White CO~ ◄ FIDEt><tTIAL had a 153 by 57 orbit. So, they were talking to us. I don't think I ought to read off this stuff now, but they gave us the 2-1 data and all the nominal data we were supposed to get. It came out fine. Say again what the IVI's were while we rolled right-side-up. Right . At the position we decided on taking our IVI readings, which was heads up in a zero-zero attitude, you read off the IVI's to me as 20 for­ ward, 11 right, and 5 down. Okay. Then I didn't bother nulling the pitch -· needle because we were really pressed for time to get around. No velocity correction was called up to us and since we had no velocity correction, and we were fairly busy at this time, I didn't even read out the 52 or 70. I wasn't particularly interested in them. It ' s a funny thing though--52 was punched in and had: been read out and it showed 30. It had been punched in so it read out, you see, as soon as something came in the quantity. So, did have a readout. I read out 30. I remember looking at that. I 38 ~O ► ~flDENTI~ 3. 3 Insertion Activities McDivitt White McDivitt White I I I thrusted and got off the booster. Then I went ahead for just a short time, and then I started to turn around right away. During the turn-around, I jettisoned the fairings. They went off with a bang. I could see the fairing over the horizon scanner go, but I never did see the fairing off the nose go. I just assumed that it went. We were already in just a mass of debris up there, because when we se:p3,rated from the booster there was stuff all over. All over. It really flew by to the side of the spacecraft. Yes. It was all over the place. As we.were turning around it looked like we were going through a snow storm. There was stuff all over. Finally we got turned around, in about a minute and a half, and we could see the booster there. There ' s one thing I would certainly like to see somebody do--I'd have give my right arm to have had a camera when I turned around and saw tbe booster. I ' d like to see somebody carry a camera in a semi-•stowed position so he could immediately get it out and come around and take pictures of •CO ►~FIDE~~TIAL 39 McDivitt the booster. Either the camera, or better yet a 16 mm camera with a normal lens on it . Just tuck it to the side of your leg. If I had thought about it I think this is what I would have done-­ just connected the camera, tucked it by my leg, and taken pictures of the booster at this time. I think, Ed, this is probably one of those philo­ sophical things. On the first orbit you've got to save to prepare to come back in case you have a bad spacecraft. You 've got to be ready to reen­ ter during the first orbit . Tuis is the kind of bind we found ourselves in up there. During the first orbit we really had a lot to get ready for halfway through the second orbit, but on the other hand we had to be in good enough shape so we could reenter it at 2-1. Now, we didn't have anything to go wrong so there wasn't any problem, but I think when you first get into orbit you're in a problem. This kind of a thing, I think, is a problem you may have later on. You've got to be ready to eject at lift-off plus one second, and you don't want to be sitting there holding a camera or something like that. Both your hands are busy. But like you said we could stow it ~ONFtDf1'tliAt 40 White McDivitt White McDivitt White McDivitt White 3omewhere. I think you could. You could stow it beside you in the seat . I think we over- emphasize the neces­ sity, particularly for ejection, of having to have everything stowed when you are only ejecting up to 12 000 feet and at very slow speeds. We certainly have a heck of a lot more working against us in our airplanes we ' re flying around. That's right . I agree with you. I ' m just saying this philosophy of being completely prepared to reenter during that first orbit is in conflict with doing this kind of stuff in the first orbit, too. We ought to get some of this, though. I think we are missing things . I would have really-­ Yes, I think so. We could have really had some beautiful pictures of that booster when we were close to it. I also want to comment a little bit on the booster itsel f . I looked as closely as I could at the nozzle skirt and the aft end of the booster, and I saw no damage whatsoever. No, neither did I from our vantage point . As far as I could see the nozzle skirt was com­ ,COI>~11;) El>fftAL 41 McDivitt White McDivitt pletely intact. There was nothing wrong. Okay. Let ' s try to follow this insertion activi­ ties list here . I jettisoned the fairings , as I said, as soon as I started turning around. Then Ed went through the checklist for us. After I fired the fairings I turned off the BIA Switch and the retro rockets when he called. I was probably doing this before Ed called, wasn ' t I? We did things just like we had been doing them on the simulator. We don't just take a checklist and run down it item for item because there ' re things you have to be doing , and it just doesn ' t go in a sequence like that . I realized this was the way it was going to go, and I actually took a pencil and checked items off. If you did an item I checked it off, and if you didn't I left it un­ checked and we got it later. You just can' t ex­ pect to run down the checklist item for item because you ' re not ready to unstow your life vest or to get up out of your seat belt. You don't do that for some time. I think the logic on the check­ list we have here is a very good sequence--. We reviewed that checklist 50 times. That's 00tq ftf)ENftA-t­ 42 White McDivitt White McDivitt cor<tFIDENTIAt probably the fiftieth checklist we ' ve got there, and I don ' t think i t could have been arranged any better for the two of us . I knew Jim wasn't going to undo his seat belt har­ ness and I knew I was going to have to because I had to do certain things that he didn ' t have to . The point that I ' m making is that the checklist doesn ' t have to be accomplished item for item, completely done in numerical sequence. Okay. I thi nk we ' ll revert back to the exact subject of 3,3 now. Safetying the switches . I saftied the swi t ches--the BIA Squib Switch and the four Retro Rocket Squibs Switches. I tested the sequential l i ghts, but at a later time because I was involved in turning the spacecraft around. But X did test them. As far as stowage, I stowed my left arm restraint and my D- ring, but I did not put my saf ety pin in. I went through and put my arm rest down , put my safety pin in. That was one of the first things I did. I might comment that I never did put my safety pin in. I never put the safety pin in the D- ring. I felt the D- ring cover was adequate, and it was . co ► ~fiilQ lil)l:rlsA<JL 43 White I know, you never have been particularl y too hot on that. McDi vitt Noo White Then I went ahead and disconnected myself. I had a lot of things I had to squirm around and do. I left my life vest on as we had planned to do , then take them off leisurely at a different time. I did not find any reason to put the drogue pins in. I don't think they are satisfactory in any way. I don' t think the pin itself is sati sfactory, and I don ' t think the location or type of holes are satisfactory. I will elaborate on them a little further. We have had aircraft around for a long time and we have learned a lot about saf ety pins . We have come up with some pretty good designs on safety pins. We have a design on our drogue pin right now which is no more than the very first type of safety pin that I saw on an aircraft. I think that we are past the point where we should be starting right out at the beginning. We ought to put a properly designed safety pin in there that you can insert a little easier into the holes. I ' m not going to try to design the pin but I think that it should have some type of shaft on it that r€0NFll}ENftl(L ­ 44 McDivitt -E OI'~FI DE~ITIAL you can use to stabilize the pin when you insert it. And when I say the holes through which you insert the pins are unsatisfactory, I 'm referring to holes through a cylindr i cal shaft that is hollow inside so t hat you not only have t o find the hole to put it in on one side, but you have to work it around and find the hole that it goes through on the other side. I don ' t believe that's satisfactory. I don't think the opening into the hole is supposed to be beveled and they weren 't beveled on my seat and they weren't beveled on Jim ' s seat , either. I t hink a beveled hole is a hole that is bigger on the outside than it is on the inside. I don' t believe there is much dif­ ference between the outside and the inside of the holes for the drogue pins. I had a difficult time putting my own in. I put Jim's pins in. It took me awhile, but I put them in. I never did get one of mine in satisfactorily at this time , so I think we should do something better with the drogue pins. In addition I couldn' t even see the hole. You had an easier time putting my pin in t han you had putt ing your own pin in. GO~~FIDEl>ITIAL 45 White McDivitt White McDivitt White .-CQ~qfl9tNTIAL That' s correct. I could put yours in fairly easy. That's right . I think that when you turn towards the center of the spacecraft , you end up with more room than if you turned to the outside. You can' t see a thing if you are turning toward the outside. This is probably covered later, but my hose lengths were not long enough to permit me to turn all the way around , I knew this when we went through Weight and Balance. I knew my hoses were not long enough but it was too late, as far as I was concerned, t o change them at that ti~ . But, I couldn't see the holes on my side to insert the drogue pin. I couldn' t see the holes for your drogue pin either, but I could get a better view of them over there so I knew approximately where t o put the pin, I think in all respects the drogue pins are not satisfactory. You just can't see them; the pins are incorrect, the holes are in­ correct, and I think we can certainly do better with them. I think what Ed is saying is that it 's lousy. That's right. In two letter words, it stinks ! This is the way the batteries were reading out when I checked them at insertion. And this is what CO ► 4FIDE~~rft"AI: €O ►~FIDEt4Tl~L I had suspected they were doing when we launched-­ why we had unbal anced stack readings. 1-A read 6 amps, 1-B read 10 , 1-C read 11. This accounts for your high reading on Stack 1. 2-A was 6, 2-B was 6, , and 2-C was 6. . Ttis was the way they were reading. I ran through a check on them when we were actually in the booster phase. So that is why I felt the reading wasn ' t bad. They were both reading about 23 1/2 or 24 volts . They looked pretty good. I got my 2-1 update. I got the t:N of 167, 6T of 3+35, and GMT to retro command of 14 48 34. I have the other times too. The time to 400 000 was 2+18, as read up to me and the time to reverse bank angle was 8+47. This is what we wrote down . This is one time I remember now when I was a little irritated, because they gave times to us in a manner in which I hadn 't wanted them toe They were supposed to give elapsed time but they gave it to us in GMT time for our retro. We had asked them to give it to us in elapsed, They came right back up and gave it to us both ways. I remember writing it down twice, on the elapsed time of 01 32 35. I can see why they did it because it 47 McDivitt White CONFtf>E~ftAi. was two minutes past one hour 30 minutes, and I guess they weren't sure exactly what we wanted. So they gave it to us in GMT and elapsed time also . But that is the information we received, as far as our 2-1 area was concerned. I think Ed had better cover unstowage. I didn't unstow anything. I was just trying to stick with the booster at that time. The first thing I got into was my right-hand stowage compartment and I unstowed the blood pressure bulb. Then I started into the center section to get at the camera. The first thing I wanted to get out was the Hasselblad and the 16 mm. I was dying to get a picture of that booster. So , I unstowed the Hasselblad and got a good back on it and the 16 mm camera. I didn't unstow the urine nozzle as the flight plan had called. We both had decided we were going to use our launch­ day urine bags as long as we could, and we had hoped to use them right through the ENA. As it turned out, we did. That was about all I unstowed at this time. I unstowed the cameras, the blood pressure bulb and also got out the film cartridges and the tape cartridges. I put them on the side CONFIDENTIAb 48 COt'4FI0EN-l+M. of the foot well , where I planned to keep them, so that we could keep a good tape cartridge available. 49 McDivitt ---G0NF-40 ENTIA L_, 4.0 ORBITAL FLIGHT I think that the orbital flight should be broken down into some very distinct sequences . I think there are really three of these. The first one is about the first three or four orbi ts where we were trying to stay with the booster, where we di d the FNA and where we finally got back in. The time that we finally got the spacecraft depressur­ ized ends one phase of the mission. The next phase or sequence of the things that come along is really the second phase. This is the middle 50 orbits or so, where we did the experiments and where we did the flight plan in a highly modified manner. We did the flight plan we started out to do . And the last phase or series of sequences was the ~et ro-preparation , retrofire and the reentry. The retro-preparation was actually another distinct phase of the mission. I think that we ought to divide it up into those three phases-- the station-keeping and FNA as Stage 1, general orbit as Stage 2, and retro-preparation and reentry as Stage 3. So I think we should CONFID ~~:rtAl 50 4. 1 Station-Keeping McDivitt ~-IE>ENTIAL­ start in the orbital flight with the station­ keeping on the booster. I think that we should just pluck that thing out and follow it through in its entirety, and then come back and pick up these things like the thrusters , Control :fode Checks , Com Checks , and those things. The station-keeping with the booster--Well, as I said earlier on the insertion phase , I started turning around as soon as I completed the forward thrusting. I jettisoned the nose fairings after about 30 or 40 degrees of yaw. I rolled right­ side-up and then I started yawing around to the left. We saw all kinds of debris floating around and we finally saw the booster back behind us. It was already in a peculiar attitude. As Ed men­ tioned , when we separated from the booster, it didn·• t really feel like we came off straight ahead. It seemed like we got knocked off to the side of the thing. The spacecraft-booster combination sort of bent in half at the separation plane. We yawed on around and saw the booster, and I thought it was around 400 feet back. Eli thought it was a little closer. -€0·NFIDE~L 51 White McDivitt £.ONfll)ENTIAf I would estimate it at between 200 and 250 feet. Okay. We were in pretty good shape right then and I applied about five or six seconds of thrusting that should have come out around 5~ feet/second . I was in a hurry trying to get our separation velocity stopped, so I was thrusting. I had it in Rate Command . I pointed the space­ craft at the booster and started thrusting, and by the time I got the computer in the Catch- Up Mode and the Start Comp button on, I had already thrusted ' 2 or 3 -~ feet/second out and I counted up another · 3 feet/second on the IVI's. It looked like we were probably stopped, although I couldn't tell tlBt quickly. I knew I had as much f::.V in there as I had at separation, and possibly a little more, because I tried to hold the separation f::.V down to no more than •5 feet/second. We watched it for just a short time and then it was obvious that we hadn't stopped our separation velocity--our relative velocity--so we were still separating. So , I applied about ano­ ther •• 3 or • 4 feet/second, which should have more than overcome the :4 or · 5 feet/second I put in initially. It looked like we had stopped .CO NFlD-E-~IlAL 52 White McDivitt White McDivitt then. Our relative velocity looked like it went to zero. Here, I thought, we were out around 500 or 600 feet. F.d thought we were: probably in closer than that. Yes. I thought we were in a little closer. I put in a total of around· 9 feet/second in the first minute and a half after we turned around . I think we commented together on the speed with which the booster was going away ~om us . Right off the bat it looked like it wa.s- -it surprised me that it actually looked like it separated ·rrom us as fast as it really-­ It looked like it had a lot more velocity than the 4 or 5 J feet/second I added at t he separation. It looked to me , as an off- the- top- of:. my-head-guess , that something in the spacecraft separation thing had really built up a lot of relative velocity between the booster and the spacecraft. I don't know why or how. Al so , it looked like we weren ' t inplane anymore. It was actually out-of-plane so that we had an out- of­ plane relative velocity that I took out . I pointed at the booster because , obviously, if --EONffOfNTt~t. 53 €0NftDEM11:At~ you're separating away from something, whichever way you ' re going, if you point at the thing and if you t hrust in that direction you are to take out your relative velocity in all planes . So , it looked like the thing was off to the left or to the south of our orbital track by a couple hundred feet and it was going down rapidly. Losing altitude. After I thrusted this second time, I knew I had more than enough velocity, much more than I needed to kill off the 5 feet/second we'd added . I watched it and it looked like it wasn ' t going away from us anymore. It looked like our relative velocities had stopped. I wanted to ·· get the platform alined somewhat in case we did have---to come down in the 2~1. We